Abstract
We study the stability and the stability index of the meet game form defined on a meet semilattice. Given any active coalition structure, we show that the stability index relative to the equilibrium, to the beta core and to the exact core is a function of the Nakamura number, the depth of the semilattice and its gap function.
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Abdou, J.M. Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice. Int J Game Theory 41, 775–789 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0339-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0339-5