Price regulation in a spatial duopoly with possible non-buyers
- Jeroen Hinloopen
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discount
Rent now* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.
Get AccessAbstract.
If the price is regulated in a spatial duopoly where consumers have a finite upper bound as to the price they are willing to pay for the differentiated product, in most cases the Principle of Minimum Differentiation does not apply. Depending on the market structure firms either (i) form local monopolies, or (ii) differentiate intermediately, or (iii) agglomerate at the market centre. Minimum differentiation is never total-surplus-maximizing nor desired by firms. In most cases the regulator sets a price below that maximizing industry profits. For a substantial range of market configurations the regulated (first-best) price exceeds marginal cost. This induces firms to serve a larger part of the market.
- Title
- Price regulation in a spatial duopoly with possible non-buyers
- Journal
-
The Annals of Regional Science
Volume 36, Issue 1 , pp 19-39
- Cover Date
- 2002-02-01
- DOI
- 10.1007/s001680200074
- Print ISSN
- 0570-1864
- Online ISSN
- 1432-0592
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Additional Links
- Keywords
-
- JEL classification: D43, L13
- Industry Sectors
- Authors
-
- Jeroen Hinloopen (A1)
- Author Affiliations
-
- A1. University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Department of Economics, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands (e-mail: J.Hinloopen@tbm.tudelft.nl; http://www.tbm.tudelft.nl/webstaf/jeroenhi), and Tinbergen Institute and Delft University of Technology, NL