Journal of Population Economics

, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp 805–834

Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention

  • Alessandro Cigno
  • Mizuki Komura
  • Annalisa Luporini
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00148-017-0639-y

Cite this article as:
Cigno, A., Komura, M. & Luporini, A. J Popul Econ (2017) 30: 805. doi:10.1007/s00148-017-0639-y

Abstract

We demonstrate that the notion of a family ‘constitution’ (self-enforcing, renegotiation-proof norm) requiring adults to provide attention for their elderly parents carries over from a world where identical individuals reproduce asexually, to one where individuals differentiated by sex and preferences marry, have children and bargain over the allocation of domestic resources. In this heterogenous world, couples are sorted by their preferences. If a couple’s common preferences satisfy a certain condition, the couple have an interest in instilling those preferences into their children. Policies are generally nonneutral. In particular, wage redistribution may raise, and compulsory education will reduce, the share of the adult population that is governed by family constitutions, and thus the share of the elderly population who receive attention from their children.

Keywords

Support of the elderly Marriage Matching Family constitution Preference transmission Policy neutrality 

JEL Classification

D1 I2 I3 J1 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alessandro Cigno
    • 1
  • Mizuki Komura
    • 2
  • Annalisa Luporini
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics and ManagementUniversity of FlorenceFlorenceItaly
  2. 2.Faculty of EconomicsMusashi UniversityTokyoJapan

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