Abstract
In mid-twentieth century, the hypothesis, ‘a machine can think’ became very popular after, Alan Turing’s article on ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’. This hypothesis, ‘a machine can think’ established the foundations of machine intelligence (MI), and claimed that machines have consciousness and creativity, with the power to compete with human beings. In the first section, I shall show how consciousness and creativity is conceptualized in the domain of MI. The main aim of MI is not only to construct difficult programs to solve our day-to-day problems, but also to reproduce mentality in machines. It was claimed that all the mental qualities are ascribable to machines. My intention in this paper is to clarify consciousness and creativity from a subjective point of view. My claim is that consciousness and creativity cannot be fully represented in a mechanistic domain. There are subjective mental or conscious states, which can be seen in a first-person perspective of their proper understanding.
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Acknowledgment
My sincere thanks and regards to my supervisor Prof. R. C. Pradhan for his constant guidance and for helping me to improve the philosophical quality of my paper. All the errors, if any, are mine.
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Nath, R. Machine intelligence (MI), competence and creativity. AI & Soc 23, 441–458 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-007-0080-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-007-0080-y