Abstract
This is a talk delivered at the conference “Mathematics in a Complex World”, on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the Politecnico di Milano. Asymmetry of information, i.e. the possibility for human beings to hide their information, or not to keep their promises, is a fundamental fact of social life, and must be taken into account. I will show how this creates complexity, even in the very simple situation of a contract between two parties, one of whom commits to work for the other, but cannot be monitored.
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Lecture given in the conference “Mathematics in a Complex World”, Politecnico di Milano, Feb. 28–March 1, 2013
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Ekeland, I. How to Build Stable Relationships Between People Who Lie and Cheat. Milan J. Math. 82, 67–79 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00032-014-0214-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00032-014-0214-x