Abstract
We propose a Bayesian approach to inference in repeated oral English auctions. The model allows for a dynamic behavior of the sequence of selling prices. We apply the technique to a sale of antiques and find a clear evidence of dynamic effects.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bajari, P. (1997). A structural econometric model of the first-price sealedbid auction with asymmetric bidders. Preprint, University of Minnesota.
Bernardo, J. M. andSmith, A. F. M. (1994)Bayesian Theory. Wiley, London.
Bikhchandani, S. (1988). Reputation in repeated second-price auctions.Journal of Economic Theory, 46: 97–119.
Florens, J. P. andProtopopescu, C. (1997). Indirect nonparamentric estimation of a cumulative distribution function. Preprint. Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse.
Florens, J. P., Protopopescu, C., andRichard, J. F. (1998). Identification and estimation of a class of game theoretic models. Document de Travail 79, Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse.
Ginsburgh, V. (1998). Absentee bidders and the declining price anomaly in wine auctions.Journal of Political Economy, 106: 1302–1319.
Hamilton, J. D. (1994).Times serie Analysis Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Jouneau-Sion, F. (2000). Econométrie structurelles et comportements stratégiques.Revue Française d'économie.XV, pp. 195–217.
Jouneau-Sion, F. andTorrès, O. (2000). Progressive and discrete auctions: A finite sample approach. CORE D. P. 2000/46, Université catholique de Louvain.
Laffont, J. J., Ossard, H., andVuong, Q. (1995). Econometrics of first-price auctions.Econometrica, 63: 953–980.
Paarsch, H. (1992). Deciding between the common value and independent private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions.Journal of Econometrics, 51: 191–215.
Pesendorfer, M. (1995). A study of collusion in first-price auctions: Part I and II. Preprint, Northwestern University.
Sareen, S. (1998). Likelihood based estimation of symmetric parametric structural auctions models with independent private values. Preprint, University of Toronto.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders.Journal of Finance, 16: 8–37.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Albano, G.L., Jouneau-Sion, F. Bayesian inference in repeated English auctions. Test 13, 193–211 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02603006
Received:
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02603006