Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 3, Issue 3, pp 359–380

Constitutional choice for the control of water pollution

  • Roger E. Meiners
  • Bruce Yandle
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF02393141

Cite this article as:
Meiners, R.E. & Yandle, B. Constit Polit Econ (1992) 3: 359. doi:10.1007/BF02393141

Abstract

Before passage of the Clean Water Act, water pollution was controlled by the common law of nuisance and the law of water rights. Had the common law not been superseded, it might have provided more ecologically sound pollution control than has occurred under the command-and-control statutory regime. The Clean Water Act imposes mechanical definitions and is subject to political interference. In contrast, the principle of the common law lies in its evolutionary and competitive nature, which is consistent with the market process.

Copyright information

© George Mason University 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roger E. Meiners
    • 1
    • 2
  • Bruce Yandle
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Legal StudiesClemson UniversityClemson
  2. 2.Center for Policy StudiesClemson UniversityClemson