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Notes
“The Identity of Linguistic Expressions and the Paradox of Analysis,”Philosophical Studies, 1:24–31 (1950).
For a justification of this use of the term “type,” according to which the linguistic function performed in common by “red,” “rot,” and “rouge” is the type, whereas the latter, called types by Peirce, are to be called token-classes, see footnote 2 to the paper inPhilosophical Studies, p. 31.
Compare Russell's distinction between simple and complex symbols, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,”Monist, 28:495–527 (1918); 29:32–63, 190–222, 345–80 (1919).
For a more detailed presentation of these distinctions, together with a discussion of the light they throw on questions relating to translation and the use of quotation marks, see my “Quotation Marks, Sentences and Propositions,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 10:515–25 (1950).
For a defense and elaboration of this account of thinking and awareness, see my essay, “Language, Rules and Behavior,” inJohn Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, Sidney Hook, ed. (New York: Dial Press, 1950).
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Sellars, W. Gestalt qualities and the paradox of analysis. Philos Stud 1, 92–94 (1950). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02199412
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02199412