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Qualia, Sensa und absolute Prozesse

Qualia, sensa and absolute processes

Zu W. Sellars' Kritik des psychocerebralen Reduktionismus

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Summary

In this paper, the development of Sellars' thoughts concerning the mind-body-problem is reconstructed. Starting from an elaborate critique of the identity theory, Sellars claims that the ultimate ‘Scientific Image’ must contain a concept ofsensa as the bearers of certain properties of manifest sense impressions. In his later work Sellars' notion ofabsolute processes leads him to a new monism and thus to an extended critique of rival theories. It is argued that these Sellarsian thoughts can be helpful in the actual discussion of the mind-body-problem.

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Kurthen, M. Qualia, Sensa und absolute Prozesse. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 21, 25–46 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801415

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