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Wahrheit und Selbstrückbezüglichkeit

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Summary

This paper is intended to discuss the problems occurring in the relation between the notion of truth and the question of self-reference. To do this, we shall review Tarski's (T) convention and its related terminology. We shall clarify the relation between truth and extension in order to lead into the question of semantic paradoxes appearing in the theoretical models concerned with truth. Subsequently, we shall review the logical system which develops in the reformulation of the modal proposal of the (T) convention. In closing, we shall critically examine Kripke's interpretation from the proposals made by Tarski.

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Padilla-Galvez, J. Wahrheit und Selbstrückbezüglichkeit. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22, 111–132 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801252

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