Abstract
This paper reports an experimental investigation of the hypothesis that in coordination games, players draw on shared concepts of salience to identify ‘focal points’ on which they can coordinate. The experiment involves games in which equilibria can be distinguished from one another only in terms of the way strategies are labelled. The games are designed to test a number of specific hypotheses about the determinants of salience. These hypotheses are generally confirmed by the results of the experiment.
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Mehta, J., Starmer, C. & Sugden, R. Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation. Theor Decis 36, 163–185 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079211
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079211