Abstract
It is argued that existing axiomatic theories of utility do not provide the utility principle or the principle of maximising expected utility with a formal justification. It is also argued that these theories only put mild constraints on a decision-maker in a decision-context. Finally, it is argued that the prospects are not particularly bright for finding formal non-circular arguments for the utility principle that do not rely on the law of large numbers.
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Malmnäs, Pe. Axiomatic justifications of the utility principle: A formal investigation. Synthese 99, 233–249 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064430
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064430