Skip to main content
Log in

Close enough to reference

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper proposes a response to the duplication objection to the descriptive theory of singular mental reference. This objection involves hypothetical cases in each of which there are a pair of qualitatively indistinguishable objects and a thought that apparently refers to only one of the pair, despite the descriptive indistinguishability of the two objects. I identify a concept of reference-likeness or closeness to reference, which is related to the concept of genuine singular reference as the concept of truthlikeness or closeness to truth is related to the concept of truth. My response to the duplication objection is to say that the hypothetical cases it involves establish only that a thought can come close enough to singular reference to a thing despite not genuinely referring to that thing, a consequence that is compatible with the descriptive theory of singular mental reference.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Adams, E. W.: 1990, Review of Niiniluoto (1987),Synthese 84, 139–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Austin, D. F.: 1990,What's the Meaning of “This”?: A Puzzle About Demonstrative Belief, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

    Google Scholar 

  • Castañeda, H.-N.: 1966, ‘“He”: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness’,Ratio 8, 130–57.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, R. M.: 1976,Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, R. M.: 1979, ‘The Indirect Reflexive,’, in J. Teichman and C. Diamond (eds.),Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 39–53.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, R. M.: 1981,The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Devitt, M.: 1981,Designation, Columbia University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Devitt, M. and K. Sterelny: 1987,Language and Reality, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

    Google Scholar 

  • Field, H.: 1973, ‘Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference‘,The Journal of Philosophy 70, 462–81.

    Google Scholar 

  • James, W.: 1885, ‘On the Function of Cognition’,Mind 10, 27–34 (reprinted as Chapter 1 in: James: 1909,The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to ‘Pragmatism’, Longmans, Green, London and New York).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D.: 1989, ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Indexicals’, in J. Almog et al. eds.,Themes From Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 481–563 (previously circulated widely as an unpublished typescript: 1977, draft no. 2).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S.: 1980,Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (originally published in: D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.): 1972,Semantics of Natural Language, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 253–355, 763–69).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvart, I.: 1989, ‘Divided Reference’,Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14, 140–79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. K.: 1979, ‘AttitudesDe Dicto andDe Se’,The Philosophical Review 88, 513–43 (reprinted in: Lewis: 1983,Philosophical Papers, Volume I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 133–56).

    Google Scholar 

  • Martens, D. B.: 1990,Some Descriptional Theories of First-Person Thoughts, Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown University, Providence, unpublished.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martens, D. B.: forthcoming a, ‘Modality and Descriptive Reference’.

  • Martens, D. B.: forthcoming b, ‘Aspects of Indexical Attitudes’.

  • Martens, D. B.: forthcoming c, Review of Austin (1990),Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

  • Miller, D.: 1974, ‘Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude’,The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25, 166–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I.: 1987,Truthlikeness, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oddie, G.: 1981, ‘Verisimilitude Revisited’,The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32, 237–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oddie, G.: 1986,Likeness to Truth, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J.: 1977, ‘Frege on Demonstratives’,The Philosophical Review 86, 474–97.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J.: 1979, ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’,Noŭs 13, 3–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plato: 1972, ‘Theaetetus’, in G. Matthews (ed.),Plato's Epistemology and Other Logical Problems, trans. G. Matthews, Humanities Press, New York, pp. 136–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R.: 1965,Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 2nd ed., Basic Books, New York (1st ed.: 1963).

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H.: 1975, ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in K. Gunderson (ed.),Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume VII: Language, Mind, and Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 131–93 (reprinted in: Putnam: 1975,Philosophical Papers, Volume 2: Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 215–71).

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B.: (1940),An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, George Allen & Unwin, London, and W. W. Norton, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B.: 1959,My Philosophical Development, George Allen & Unwin, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. and G. Frege: 1980, Letters dated 13.11.1904 and 12.12.1904, in G. Gabriel et al. (eds.),Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 160–70.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, N.: 1981,Reference and Essence, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiffer, S.: 1978, ‘The Basis of Reference’,Erkenntnis 13, 171–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E.: 1970, ‘Propositional AttitudesDe Dicto andDe Re’,The Journal of Philosophy 67, 883–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E.: 1981, ‘Propositions and Indexical Attitudes’, in H. Parrett (ed.),On Believing: Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, pp. 316–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E.: 1983, ‘Consciousness of the Self and of the Present’, in J. E. Tomberlin (ed.),Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castañeda, with his Replies, Hackett, Indianapolis, pp. 131–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E.: 1988, ‘Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge’,Mind 97, 153–88.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E. and M. Pastin: 1981, ‘A Rejoinder on Actions andDe Re Belief’,Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11, 735–39.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, P. F.: 1959,Individuals, Methuen, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tichy, P.: 1978, ‘Verisimilitude Revisited’,Synthese 38, 175–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turner, D.: 1976, ‘Devitt's Causal Theory of Reference’,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54, 153–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Urbach, P.: 1983, ‘Intimations of Similarity: The Shaky Basis of Verisimilitude’,The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34, 266–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yourgrau, P.: 1990, ‘The Path Back to Frege’, in P. Yourgrau (ed.),Demonstratives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 97–132.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

This paper is based on part of Chapter 5 of Martens (1990). An earlier version of the paper was read at the University of Calgary and at the University of Virginia. For helpful discussions and suggestions, I especially owe thanks to David Bennett, Cora Diamond, John Greco, Theodore Guleserian, Bindu Madhok, C. B. Martin, Ernest Sosa, Robert Welshon, and an anonymous referee of this journal.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Martens, D.B. Close enough to reference. Synthese 95, 357–377 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063878

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063878

Keywords

Navigation