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Savings and loan and finance industry PAC contributions to incumbent members of the House Banking Committee

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between campaign contributions from savings and loan and finance industry PACs and membership on the House Banking Committee. The distinguishing features of this paper are that we focus on campaign contributions at an industry level, and we use regression analysis to determine whether membership on the House Banking Committee, the committee with oversight responsibility for the savings and loan industry, influences the level of contributions received by an individual legislator. We find that members of the House Banking Committee do receive significantly greater contributions from the savings and loan and finance PACs than do other members of Congress and that being chairman of the House Banking Committee also pays a dividend.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, School of Business Administration, Gonzaga University, 99202, Spokane, WA

    Randall W. Bennett

  2. Department of Economics, College of Business, Boise State University, 83725, ID

    Christine Loucks

Authors
  1. Randall W. Bennett
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  2. Christine Loucks
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Additional information

This paper was presented at the 1991 Southern Economic Association Meetings in Nashville, Tennessee; we thank discussants at our session for helpful comments. We also thank Jack Van Deventer for computational assistance and an anonymous referee for valuable comments. Any remaining errors are our responsibility.

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Bennett, R.W., Loucks, C. Savings and loan and finance industry PAC contributions to incumbent members of the House Banking Committee. Public Choice 79, 83–104 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047920

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