Abstract
In a recent article in this journal (Adams and Aizawa 1992), Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa argued that Jerry Fodor's proposed naturalistic sufficient condition for meaning is unsatisfactory. In this paper, I respond to Adams and Aizawa, noting that (1) they have overestimated the importance of their “pathologies” objection, perhaps as a consequence of misunderstanding Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition, (2) they have misunderstood Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition in formulating their Twin Earth objection, and (3) they have, in addition to under describing their “clear counterexample” to Fodor's proposal, in fact identified a satisfactory Fodorian rejoiner to their objection. I conclude that Fodor's proposal is, for all Adams and Aizawa have shown, adequate as a naturalistic theory of content.
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References
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Warfield, T.A. Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa. Mind Mach 4, 205–214 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00974145
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00974145