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On nonunique closed-loop Nash equilibria for a class of differential games with a unique and degenerated feedback solution

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In this paper, we derive essentially nonunique closed-loop Nash equilibria for a class of nonzero-sum differential games with a unique and degenerated feedback Nash equilibrium.

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Communicated by G. Leitmann

The helpful comments of Professor G. Leitmann and three anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.

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Mehlmann, A., Willing, R. On nonunique closed-loop Nash equilibria for a class of differential games with a unique and degenerated feedback solution. J Optim Theory Appl 41, 463–472 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935365

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