Abstract
This paper defends scientific realism, the doctrine that we should interpret theories as being just as ontologically committing as beliefs at the observational level. I examine the character of observation to show that the difference in interpretation suggested by anti-realists is unwarranted. Second, I discuss Wilfrid Sellars' approach to the issue. Finally, I provide a detailed study of recent work by Bas van Fraassen. While van Fraassen's work is the focus of the paper, the conclusions are far broader: That a wide family of anti-realist views (of which van Fraassen's is only one) is problematic and unmotivated and hence to be rejected.
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Creath, R. Taking theories seriously. Synthese 62, 317–345 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869409
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869409