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Epistemic norms

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I want to thank Alvin Goldman, Roderick Wiltshire, Stewart Cohen, Hilary Kornblith, and Frederick Schmitt for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Pollock, J.L. Epistemic norms. Synthese 71, 61–95 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00486436

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