Abstract
An improvement on Horwich's so-called “pseudo-proof” of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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The authors would like to thank the two anonymous referees and Jeff Paris for their helpful and encouraging remarks. It goes without saying, of course, that the responsibility for any further errors, ambiguities or whatever, is entirely ours.
We would also like to acknowledge the support given by the Centre of Logic. Epistemology and History of Science of the University of Campinas and, in the case of French, the Brazilian Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), in the preparation of this work.
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da Costa, N.C.A., French, S. On Russell's principle of induction. Synthese 86, 285–295 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485812
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485812