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Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees

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Abstract

This paper analyzes a 3-person voting game in which two or three players have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. Once the set of possible alternatives and the structure of the voting procedure are known, the players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the actual choice over outcomes takes place in the choice of alternatives to be voted on, i.e., the agenda. An equilibrium to this agenda-formation game in shown to exist under different assumptions about the information relative to the order of the players in the voting game. Further, this equilibrium is computed and found to possess certain features which are attractive from a normative point of view.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, 14627, Rochester, NY, USA

    J. S. Banks

  2. Department of Economics, University of Rochester, 14627, Rochester, NY, USA

    J. S. Banks

  3. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 91125, Pasadema, CA, USA

    F. Gasmi

Authors
  1. J. S. Banks
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  2. F. Gasmi
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Additional information

Prepared for delivery at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The New Orleans Hilton, August 29–September 1, 1985. We would like to thank Richard McKelvey, Norman Schofield and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. We retain responsibility for remaining errors.

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Banks, J.S., Gasmi, F. Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 133–152 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00450995

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00450995

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