Studia Logica

, Volume 50, Issue 2, pp 321–331

Minimally inconsistent LP

Authors

  • Graham Priest
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Queensland
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00370190

Cite this article as:
Priest, G. Stud Logica (1991) 50: 321. doi:10.1007/BF00370190

Abstract

The paper explains how a paraconsistent logician can appropriate all classical reasoning. This is to take consistency as a default assumption, and hence to work within those models of the theory at hand which are minimally inconsistent. The paper spells out the formal application of this strategy to one paraconsistent logic, first-order LP. (See, Ch. 5 of: G. Priest, In Contradiction, Nijhoff, 1987.) The result is a strong non-monotonic paraconsistent logic agreeing with classical logic in consistent situations. It is shown that the logical closure of a theory under this logic is trivial only if its closure under LP is trivial.

Copyright information

© Polish Academy of Sciences 1991