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A dilemma for internal realism

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Conclusion

Given my dilemma, then, we should think twice before following Putnam away from metaphysical realism. Internal realism can offer only a false sense of philosophical security. And now we may doubt that it can offer even that.

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References

  • Moser, Paul. 1989. Knowledge and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Putnam, Hilary. 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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  • Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Putnam, Hilary. 1983. Realism and Reason (Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Putnam, Hilary. 1987. The Many Faces of Realism. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court.

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  • Putnam, Hilary. 1988. Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, Loyola University of Chicago, 60626, Chicago, IL, USA

    Paul K. Moser

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  1. Paul K. Moser
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Moser, P.K. A dilemma for internal realism. Philosophical Studies 59, 101–106 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368394

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368394

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