Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Belief in discourse representation theory

  • Published:
Journal of Philosophical Logic Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Conclusion

I hope I have convinced the reader that DR theory offers at least some exciting potential when applied to the semantics of belief reports. It differs considerably from other approaches, and it makes intuitively acceptable predictions that other theories do not. The theory also provides a novel approach to the semantics of other propsitional attitude reports. Further, DR theory enables one to approach the topic of anaphora within belief and other propositional attitude contexts in a novel way, thus combining the semantics developed here with one of the theory's original motivations (Kamp, 1981a). However, these are unfortunately topics that I must reserve for another time.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Asher, N.: 1982, Truth Conditions and Semantic Competence: Toward a Theory of Linguistic Understanding, Ph.D. thesis, Yale University.

  • Asher, N.: 1984, ‘Semantic Competence and Linguistic Understanding,’ forthcoming.

  • Asher, N. and Kamp, H.: 1985, ‘The Knower's Paradox and Logics of the Attitudes,’ Journal of Symbolic Logic, forthcoming.

  • Barwise, J. and Perry, J.: 1981, ‘Situations and Attitudes,’ Journal of Philosophy 78, pp. 668–691.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barwise, J. and Perry, J.: 1983, Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonevac, D.: 1984, ‘Semantics for Clausally Complemented Verbs,’ Synthese 59, pp. 187–218.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky, N.: 1982, Some Concepts and Consequences of the Theory of Government and Binding, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Church, A.: 1950, ‘Carnap's Analysis of Belief Statements of Assertion and Belief’, Analysis 10, pp. 97–99.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cresswell, M.: 1982, ‘The Autonomy of Semantics’, in PetersS. and SaarinenE. (eds.), Processes, Beliefs and Questions, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 69–86.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cresswell, M.: 1983, ‘Belief and Visual Contradiction,’ Talk Presented to the University of Texas Philosophy Department.

  • Delacruz, E.: 1976, ‘Factives and Proposition Level Constructions,’ in ParteeB. (eds.), Montague Grammar, Academic Press, New York, pp. 177–199.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D.: 1982, ‘Beyond Belief,’ in WoodfieldA. (eds.), Thought and Intentionality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 9–62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Field, H.: 1977, ‘Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role,’ Journal of Philosophy 74, pp. 379–409.

    Google Scholar 

  • Field, H.: 1978, ‘Mental Representation’, Erkenntnis 13, pp. 9–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey, W. and Kamp, H.: 1985, ‘Distributive and Collective Plurals,’ Talk Presented at UT Conference on Syntax and Semantics, March 1985.

  • Heim, I.: 1982, The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases, Ph.D. thesis, University of Massachusetts.

  • Hintikka, J.: 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hintikka, J.: 1979, ‘Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated,’ in SaarinenE. (ed.), Game Theoretical Semantics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 367–380.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kamp, H.: 1981a, ‘A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation,’ in GroenendijkJ., JanssenTh., and StokhofM. (eds.), Formal Methods in the Study of Language, Mathematisch Centrum Tracts, Amsterdam, pp. 277–322.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kamp, H.: 1981b, ‘Reference Temporelle et Representation du Discours,’ Languages, pp. 39–64.

  • Kamp, H.: 1983, ‘Situations in Discourse without Time or Questions,’ Manuscript.

  • Kamp, H.: 1985, ‘Context Thought and Communication,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85, pp. 239–261.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kamp, H. and Rohrer, C.: 1981, ‘Tense in Texts,’ Proceedings of the 1981 Linguistics Conference at Konstanz, Germany.

  • Kaplan, D.: 1969, ‘Quantifying In,’ in DavidsonD. and HintikkaJ. (eds.), Words and Objections, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 206–242.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D.: 1977, ‘Demonstratives,’ Unpublished Mimeograph.

  • Kripke, S.: 1979, ‘A Puzzle about Belief,’ in MargalitA. (ed.), Meaning and Use, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 239–283.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvart, I.: 1983, ‘Kripke's Belief Puzzle,’ Philosophy Research Archives 9, pp. 369–412.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ladusaw, W.: 1979, Polarity Sensitivity as Inherent Scope Relations, Ph.D. thesis, The University of Texas at Austin.

  • Lewis, D.: 1972, ‘General Semantics,’ in DavidsonD. and HarmanD. (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 169–218.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marcus, R.: 1981, ‘A Proposed Solution to a Puzzle about Belief,’ in FrenchP., UehlingT., and WettsteinH. (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI: Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 501–512.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marcus, R.: 1983, ‘Rationality and Believing the Impossible,’ Journal of Philosophy 80, pp. 321–327.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mates, B.: 1952, ‘Synonymity,’ in LinskyL. (ed.), Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, pp. 111–138.

    Google Scholar 

  • Montague, R.: 1963, ‘Syntactical Treatmentsof Modality, with Corollaries on Reflexion Principles and Finite Axiomatizability,’ Acta Philosophica Fennica 16, pp. 153–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Montague, R.: 1970, ‘Pragmatics and Intensional Logic,’ Synthese 22, pp. 68–94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, R. and Hendrix, G.: 1982, ‘Computational Models of Belief and the Semantics of Belief-Sentences’, in PetersS. and SaarinenE. (eds.), Processes, Beliefs and Questions, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 107–128.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1976, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,’ in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp. 185–196.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reddam, J. P.: 1982, ‘Van Fraassen on Propositional Attitudes’, Philosophical Studies 42, pp. 101–110.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richard, M.: 1983, ‘Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 12, pp. 425–452.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soames, S.: 1985, ‘Lost Innocence,’ Linguistics and Philosophy 8, pp. 59–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomason, R.: 1980, ‘A Note on Syntactical Treatments of Modality,’ Synthese 44, pp. 391–395.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Fraassen, B.: 1978, ‘Propositional Attitudes in Weak Pragmatics,’, Studia Logica 38, pp. 365–374.

    Google Scholar 

  • Woods, W.: 1981, ‘Procedural Semantics as a Theory of Meaning,’ in JoshiA. et al., (eds.), Elements of Discourse Understanding, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 300–332.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Cognitive Science, The University of Texas at Austin, 78712, Austin, Texas, U.S.A.

    Nicholas Asher

Authors
  1. Nicholas Asher
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

I am grateful to Dan Bonevac, Irene Heim, Richard Larson, Stan Peters, Rich Thomason and especially Hans Kamp and an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Philosophical Logic for comments on previous drafts of this paper, as well as to The Center for Cognitive Science for research support.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Asher, N. Belief in discourse representation theory. J Philos Logic 15, 127–189 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00305490

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00305490

Keywords

Search

Navigation