Abstract
From a point of view like de Finetti's, what is the judgmental reality underlying the objectivistic claim that a physical magnitude X determines the objective probability that a hypothesis H is true? When you have definite conditional judgmental probabilities for H given the various unknown values of X, a plausible answer is sufficiency, i.e., invariance of those conditional probabilities as your probability distribution over the values of X varies. A different answer, in terms of conditional exchangeability, is offered for use when such definite conditional probabilities are absent.
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Jeffrey, R. Unknown probabilities. Erkenntnis 45, 327–335 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00276797
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00276797