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Gradients for the evolution of bimatrix games

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Abstract

The evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games is studied for rescaled partnership games and zero sum games. The former case leads to gradient systems. The selection equations for sexual and asexual reproduction of genotypes corresponding to mixed strategies are analysed. As examples, the origin of anisogamy and cyclic chases for predator-prey coevolution are studied.

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Koth, M., Sigmund, K. Gradients for the evolution of bimatrix games. J. Math. Biology 25, 623–635 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00275498

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00275498

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