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Research supported by NSF grant MCS 800213.
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Shafer, G. A subjective interpretation of conditional probability. J Philos Logic 12, 453–466 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00249260
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00249260