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Queue allocation of indivisible goods

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Abstract

A model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses) and the same number of individuals is considered. The allocation of houses among the individuals according to a queue order is analysed. First an allocation mechanism is constructed where it is a dominant strategy for the individuals to truthfully report their preferences. Second it is demonstrated that in order to obtain the desired allocation, the individuals must not in general report their complete ranking of the houses, but only their maximal elements in recursively defined choice sets.

Financial support from Jan Wallander's Foundation for Research in the Social Sciences is gratefully acknowledged.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Lund, P.O.Box 7082, S-220 07, Lund, Sweden

    Lars-Gunnar Svensson

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  1. Lars-Gunnar Svensson
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Svensson, LG. Queue allocation of indivisible goods. Soc Choice Welfare 11, 323–330 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183301

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183301

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