Abrams, B.A. and Schmitz, M.D. (1984). The crowding-out effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions: Cross-section evidence. National Tax Journal 37: 563–568.
Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence. Journal of Political Economy 97: 1447–1458.
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving. Economic Journal 100: 264–477.
Andreoni, J. and Scholz, J. (1990). An econometric analysis of charitable giving with interdependent preferences. SSRI Working Paper #9093. University of Wisconsin.
Becker, G. (1974). A theory of social interactions. Journal of Political Economy 82: 1063–1093.
Bergstrom, T.L., Blume, L. and Varian, H. (1986). On the private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics 29: 25–49.
Bernheim, B.D. (1986). On the voluntary and involuntary provision of public goods. American Economic Review 76: 789–793.
Blank, R.M. (1988). The effect of welfare and wage levels on the location decisions of female-headed households. Journal of Urban Economics 24: 186–211.
Boadway, R. and Flatters, F. (1982). Efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government: A synthesis and extension of recent results. Canadian Journal of Economics 15: 613–633.
Brown, C.C. and Oates, W.E. (1987). Assistance to the poor in a federal system. Journal of Public Economics 32: 307–330.
Chirinko, R.S. (1990). Altruism, egoism, and the role of social capital in the private provision of public goods. Economics and Politics 2: 275–290.
Clotfelter, C.T. 1985. Federal tax policy and charitable giving. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1986). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1994). The comparative static properties of the impure public good model. Journal of Public Economics, 54: 403–421.
Crane, R. (1992). Voluntary income redistribution with migration. Journal of Urban Economics 31: 84–98.
de Bartolome, C.A. (1990). Equilibrium and inefficiency in a community model with peer group effects. Journal of Political Economy 98: 110–133.
Epple, D. and Romer, T. (1991). Mobility and redistribution. Journal of Political Economy 99: 828–858.
Feldstein, M. (1980). A contribution to the theory of tax expenditures. In H. Aaron and M. Boskin (Eds.), The economics of taxation. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Flatters, F., Henderson, J.V. and Mieszkowski, P. (1974). Public goods, efficiency, and regional fiscal equalization. Journal of Public Economics 3: 99–112.
Gramlich, E. and Laren, D. (1984). Migration and income redistribution possibilities. Journal of Human Resources 19: 489–511.
Hochman, H. and Rodgers, J. (1977). The optimal treatment of charitable contributions. National Tax Journal 30: 1–18.
Johnson, W.R. (1991). Decentralized income redistribution reconsidered. Economic Inquiry 29: 69–78.
Khanna, J., Posnett, J. and Sandler T. (1994). Charity donations in the U.K.: New evidence based on panel data. Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.
Kingma, B.R. (1989). An accurate measurement of the crowd-out effect, income effect, and price effect for charitable contributions. Journal of Political Economy 97: 1197–1207.
Krelove, R. (1992). Competitive tax theory in open economies: Constrained efficiency and a Pigovian remedy. Journal of Public Economics 48: 361–375.
Ladd, H. and Doolittle, F. (1982). Which level of government should assist the poor? National Tax Journal 35: 323–336.
Mansoorian, A. and Myers, G.M. (1993). Attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy. Journal of Public Economics 52: 117–132.
Margolis, H. (1982). Selfishness, altruism, and rationality: A theory of social choice. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Myers, G.M. (1990). Optimality, free mobility, and the regional authority in a federation. Journal of Public Economics 43: 107–121.
Pauly, M. (1973). Income redistribution as a local public good. Journal of Public Economics 20: 77–83.
Roberts, R.D. (1984). A positive model of private charity and public transfers. Journal of Political Economy 92: 136–148.
Roberts, R.D. (1987). Financing public goods. Journal of Political Economy 95: 420–437.
Roberts, R.D. (1992). Government subsidies to private spending on public goods. Public Choice 74: 133–152.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1981). Do government grants to charity reduce private donations? In M. White (Ed.)., Nonprofit firms in a three sector economy. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
Sandler, T. and Posnett, J. (1991). The private provision of public goods: A perspective on neutrality. Public Finance Quarterly 19: 22–42.
Schiff, J.A. (1985). Does government spending crowd out charitable contributions? National Tax Journal 38: 535–546.
Simon, H. (1990). A mechanism for social selection and successful altruism. Science 250: 1665–1668.
Snodden, T.R. (1993). Voluntary transfers in a model with majority voting and local public goods. Unpublished. University of Alberta.
Steinberg, R. (1987). Voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federalist system. American Economic Review 77; 24–36.
Steinberg, R. (1991). Does government spending crowd ou donations? Interpreting the evidence. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 62: 591–617.
Sugden, R. (1982). On the economics of philantrophy. Economic Journal 92: 341–350.
Sugden, R. (1986). The economics of rights, co-operation, and welfare. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Warr, P.G. (1983). The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income. Economics Letters 13: 131–138.
Wildasin, D.E. (1991a). Income redistribution in a common labor market. American Economic Review 81: 757–774.
Wildasin, D.E. (1991b). Income redistribution and migration. Unpublished. Indiana University.
Wolpert, J. (1977). Social income and the voluntary sector. Papers, Regional Science Association 39: 217–229.