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References
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Carnegie-Mellon University. I wish to thank Tom Romer for helpful comments.
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Palfrey, T.R. Comments on the papers by Austen-Smith and Shepsle. Public Choice 50, 211–219 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124933
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124933