Public Choice

, Volume 70, Issue 2, pp 121–149

Rules and games

Authors

  • Roy Gardner
    • Department of Economics, Workshop in Political Theory & Policy AnalysisIndiana University
  • Elinor Ostrom
    • Department of Political Science, Workshop in Political Theory & Policy AnalysisIndiana University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00124480

Cite this article as:
Gardner, R. & Ostrom, E. Public Choice (1991) 70: 121. doi:10.1007/BF00124480

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes. We develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of Pareto improved equilibria points. We then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules, including examples from Malaysia, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Canada. We show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991