Dynamic Games and Applications

, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp 258-268

First online:

Open Access This content is freely available online to anyone, anywhere at any time.

Replicator Dynamics of Symmetric Ultimatum Game

  • Jacek MiękiszAffiliated withInstitute of Applied Mathematics, University of Warsaw Email author 
  • , Michał RamszaAffiliated withDepartment of Mathematics and Mathematical Economics, Warsaw School of Economics


We construct a symmetric version of the ultimatum mini game and analyze the stability of its equilibria in the replicator dynamics. We show that the mere symmetry does not lead to a unique social norm consistent with the observed experimental results. Moreover, the average offer in the population has to be lower than 50 % in order to have one of the equilibria consistent with the experimental data.


Symmetric ultimatum game Social norm Replicator dynamics