In defence of the value free ideal
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- Betz, G. Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2013) 3: 207. doi:10.1007/s13194-012-0062-x
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The ideal of value free science states that the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. moral or political) values. It has been criticized on the grounds that scientists have to employ moral judgements in managing inductive risks. The paper seeks to defuse this methodological critique. Allegedly value-laden decisions can be systematically avoided, it argues, by making uncertainties explicit and articulating findings carefully. Such careful uncertainty articulation, understood as a methodological strategy, is exemplified by the current practice of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).