European Journal for Philosophy of Science

, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp 161–179

Carnap on concept determination: methodology for philosophy of science

Original paper in Philosophy of Science

DOI: 10.1007/s13194-011-0027-5

Cite this article as:
Justus, J. Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2012) 2: 161. doi:10.1007/s13194-011-0027-5


Recent criticisms of intuition from experimental philosophy and elsewhere have helped undermine the authority of traditional conceptual analysis. As the product of more empirically informed philosophical methodology, this result is compelling and philosophically salutary. But the negative critiques rarely suggest a positive alternative. In particular, a normative account of concept determination—how concepts should be characterized—is strikingly absent from such work. Carnap's underappreciated theory of explication provides such a theory. Analyses of complex concepts in empirical sciences illustrates and supports this claim, and counteracts the charge explication is only suitable for highly mathematical, axiomatic contexts. Explication is also defended against the influential criticism it is “philosophically unilluminating”.


ExplicationCarnapStrawsonDefinitionMethodologyPrecisionEcological stabilityMeaningConcepts

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© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentFlorida State University and University of SydneyTallahasseeUSA