Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 145–169

Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults


    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Memphis
    • School of HumanitiesUniversity of Hertfordshire
  • Daniel J. Povinelli
    • Cognitive Evolution GroupUniversity of Louisiana

DOI: 10.1007/s13164-012-0093-4

Cite this article as:
Gallagher, S. & Povinelli, D.J. Rev.Phil.Psych. (2012) 3: 145. doi:10.1007/s13164-012-0093-4


We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012