Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp 173–192

Framing Joint Action

Joint Action: What is Shared?

DOI: 10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5

Cite this article as:
Pacherie, E. Rev.Phil.Psych. (2011) 2: 173. doi:10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5


Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to shared intention. I concentrate on Michael Bacharach’s version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less cognitively demanding.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut Jean-Nicod, UMR CNRS 8129 (ENS, EHESS)ParisFrance