Framing Joint Action
- Elisabeth Pacherie
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Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to shared intention. I concentrate on Michael Bacharach’s version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less cognitively demanding.
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About this Article
- Framing Joint Action
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume 2, Issue 2 , pp 173-192
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- 1. Institut Jean-Nicod, UMR CNRS 8129 (ENS, EHESS), Ecole Normale Supérieure, 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005, Paris, France