Self-ascriptions of Belief and Transparency
- Pascal Engel
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Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.
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- Self-ascriptions of Belief and Transparency
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume 1, Issue 4 , pp 593-610
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Pascal Engel (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland