Memory, Knowledge and Epistemic Competence
- Karen Shanton
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Sosa (2007) claims that a necessary condition on knowledge is manifesting an epistemic competence. To manifest an epistemic competence, a belief must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must derive from the exercise of a reliable belief-forming disposition in appropriate conditions for its exercise and (2) that exercise of the disposition in those conditions would not issue a false belief in a close possible world. Drawing on recent psychological research, I show that memories that are issued by episodic memory retrieval fail to satisfy either of these conditions. This presents Sosa, and other proponents of similar conditions (e.g. some safety theorists and process reliabilists), with a dilemma: (1) deny that episodic memories count as knowledge or (2) give up the conditions as necessary conditions on knowledge. I explore the implications of this dilemma for our understanding of knowledge, memory and the relationship between them.
- Addis, D.R., A.T. Wong, and D.L. Schacter. 2007. Remembering the past and imagining the future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration. Neuropsychologia 45: 1363–77. CrossRef
- Addis, D.R., D.C. Sacchetti, B.A. Ally, A.E. Budson, and D.L. Schacter. 2009. Episodic simulation of future events is impaired in mild Alzheimer’s disease. Neuropsychologia 47: 2660–71. CrossRef
- Ben Shalom, D. 2003. Memory in autism: review and synthesis. Cortex 39(4–5): 1129–38. CrossRef
- Bonjour, L., and E. Sosa. 2003. Epistemic justification: Internalism vs. externalism, foundations vs. virtues. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Braun, K.A., R. Ellis, and E.F. Loftus. 2002. Make my memory: How advertising can change our memories of the past. Psychology and Marketing 19: 1–23. CrossRef
- Buckner, R.L., and D.C. Carroll. 2006. Self-projection and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11(2): 49–57. CrossRef
- Conee, E., and R. Feldman. 1998. The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 89: 1–29. CrossRef
- Eich, E., J.L. Reeves, B. Jaeger, and S.B. Graff-Radford. 1985. Memory for pain: Relation between past and present pain intensity. Pain 23: 375–9. CrossRef
- Gettier, E. 1963. Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23: 121–3. CrossRef
- Goethals, G.R., and R.F. Reckman. 1973. The perception of consistency in attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 9: 491–501. CrossRef
- Goldman, A.I. 1979. What is justified belief? In Justification and knowledge: New studies in epistemology, ed. G. Pappas, 1–23. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing.
- Goldman, A.I. 2006. Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Goldman, A.I., and Shanton, K. 2010. The case for simulation theory. In Handbook of Theory of Mind eds. A. Leslie & T. German.
- Levine, L.J. 1997. Reconstructing memory for emotions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 126(2): 165–77. CrossRef
- Loftus, E.F. 1974. Reconstructing memory: The incredible eyewitness. Psychology Today 8(7): 116–9.
- Loftus, E.F. 2002. Memory faults and fixes. Issues in Science and Technology 18(4): 41–50.
- Loftus, E.F., and J.C. Palmer. 1974. Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 13: 585–9. CrossRef
- Mazzoni, G.A.L., E.F. Loftus, and I. Kirsch. 2001. Changing beliefs about implausible autobiographical events: A little plausibility goes a long way. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Applied 7: 51–9. CrossRef
- Schacter, D.L., and E. Tulving. 1994. What are the memory systems of 1994? In Memory Systems 1994, ed. D.L. Schacter and E. Tulving, 1–38. Cambridge: MIT.
- Shanton, K. and A.I. Goldman. 2010. Simulation theory. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 1(4): 527–38.
- Sosa, E. 1991. Knowledge in perspective: Selected essays in epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Sosa, E. 2003. Privileged access. In Consciousness: New philosophical perspectives, ed. Q. Smith and A. Jokic, 273–94. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sosa, E. 2007. A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Tulving, E. 2002. Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of Psychology 53: 1–25. CrossRef
- Weinberg, J., S. Nichols, and S. Stich. 2001. Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics 29: 429–60.
- Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its limits. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Memory, Knowledge and Epistemic Competence
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume 2, Issue 1 , pp 89-104
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Karen Shanton (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 1 Seminary Place, New Brunswick, NJ, 08901, USA