Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language
- Wesley Buckwalter
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Recent theories of epistemic contextualism have challenged traditional invariantist positions in epistemology by claiming that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions fluctuate between conversational contexts. Contextualists often garner support for this view by appealing to folk intuitions regarding ordinary knowledge practices. Proposed is an experiment designed to test the descriptive conditions upon which these types of contextualist defenses rely. In the cases tested, the folk pattern of knowledge attribution runs contrary to what contextualism predicts. While preliminary, these data inspire prima facie skepticism for the contextualist hypothesis regarding folk knowledge claims, as well as challenge certain predictions made by recent theories of subject-sensitive invariantism. It is further argued that such results raise methodological questions concerning the practice of relying on an assumption of intuitions, with respect to ordinary language practices, as evidence for philosophical conclusions regarding knowledge.
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- Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume 1, Issue 3 , pp 395-406
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- Springer Netherlands
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, The City University of New York Graduate Center, 365 Fifth Ave., New York, NY, 10016, USA