Adams, F., and A. Steadman. 2004a. Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding? Analysis
Adams, F., and A. Steadman. 2004b. Intentional action and moral considerations: still pragmatic. Analysis
Alexander, J., and J. Weinberg. 2007. Analytic epistemology and experimental philosophy. Philosophy Compass
Bloom, P., and T.P. German. 2000. Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind. Cognition
Christensen, D. 2007. Epistemology of disagreement: the good news. The Philosophical Review
Cummins, R. 1998. Reflection on reflective equilibrium. In Rethinking intuition, ed. M. DePaul, and W. Ramsey, 113–128. Lantham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Dwyer, S. 1999. Moral competence. In Philosophy and linguistics, ed. K. Murasugi, and R. Stanton, 169–190. Boulder: Westview.
Elga, A. 2006. Reflection and disagreement. Nous
Feldman, R. 2006. Epistemological puzzles about disagreement. In Epistemology futures, ed. S. Heatherington. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R., and F. Warfield. 2007. Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gelman, S. 2003. The essential child: Origins of essentialism in everyday thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Glasgow, J. 2008. On the methodology of the race debate: conceptual analysis and racial discourse. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Goldman, A., and J. Pust. 1998. Philosophical theory and intuitional evidence. In Rethinking intuition, ed. M. DePaul, and W. Ramsey, 179–200. Lantham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Greene, J. 2003. From neural “is” to moral “ought”: what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology? Nature Reviews Neuroscience
Greene, J., R. Sommerville, L. Nystrom, J. Darley, and J. Cohen. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science
Harman, G. 1999. Moral philosophy and linguistics. In Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, vol. I: Ethics, ed. K. Brinkmann, 107–115. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center.
Hauser, M., L. Young, and F. Cushman. 2007. Reviving rawls’ linguistic analogy: Operative principles and the causal structure of moral actions. In Moral psychology, volume 1: The evolution of morality: Adaptations and innateness, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge: MIT (Bradford Books).
Jackson, F. 1998. From metaphysics to ethics: A defense of conceptual analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnson, K. 2008. An overview of lexical semantics. Philosophy Compass 3: 119–134.
Kauppinen, A. 2007. The rise and fall of experimental philosophy. Philosophical Explorations
Kelly, T. 2005. The epistemic significance of disagreement. In Oxford studies in epistemology, vol. 1, ed. J. Hawthorne, and T. Gendler Szabo, 167–196. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. 2007. Peer Disagreements and Higher Order Evidence. In Disagreement, ed. R. Feldman, and T. Warfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. 2008. Disagreement, dogmatism, and belief polarization. The Journal of Philosophy 105: 611–633.
Knobe, J. 2003a. Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis
Knobe, J. 2003b. Intentional action in folk psychology: an experimental investigation. Philosophical Psychology
Knobe, J. 2004. Intention, intentional action and moral considerations. Analysis
Knobe, J. 2007a. Experimental philosophy and philosophical significance. Philosophical Explorations
Knobe, J. 2007b. Reason explanation in folk psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy
Lewis, D. 1970. How to define theoretical terms. Journal of Philosophy
Lewis, D. 1972. Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Machery, E. 2008. The folk concept of intentional action: philosophical and psychological issues. Mind & Language
Machery, E. 2009. Doing without concepts
. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Machery, E., S. Lindquist, and P. Griffiths. 2009. The vernacular concept of innateness. Mind & Language 24: 605–630.
Machery, E., R. Mallon, S. Nichols, and S. Stich. 2004. Semantics, Cross-cultural style. Cognition
Mallon, R. 2007. Reviving rawls inside and out. In Psychology, volume 2: The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 145–155. Cambridge: MIT (Bradford Books).
Mallon, R., and S. Nichols. in press. Moral reasoning, moral rules, and moral dilemmas. In The Oxford handbook of moral psychology, ed. J. Doris, S. Nichols, and S. Stich. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mallon, R., E. Machery, S. Nichols, and S. Stich. 2009. Against arguments from reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356.
Marcus, M. 1980. Theory of syntactic recognition for natural languages. Cambridge: MIT.
Marr, D. 1982. Vision. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Mikhail, J. 2000. Rawls’ linguistic analogy: A study of the ‘generative grammar’ model of moral theory described by John Rawls in ‘A theory of justice’. Ph.D. Thesis. Cornell University, Ithaca.
Nadelhoffer, T. 2004a. On praise, side effects, and folk ascriptions of intentionality. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
Nadelhoffer, T. 2004b. Blame, badness, and intentional action: a reply to Knobe and Mendlow. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
Nadelhoffer, T., and E. Nahmias. 2007. The past and future of experimental philosophy. Philosophical Explorations
Nahmias, E., S. Morris, T. Nadelhoffer, and J. Turner. 2005. Surveying freedom: folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology
Nahmias, E., S. Morris, T. Nadelhoffer, and J. Turner. 2006. Is incompatibilism intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Nichols, S. 2002. On the genealogy of norms: a case for the role of emotion in cultural evolution. Philosophy of Science
Nichols, S. 2006. Imaginative blocks and impossibility: An essay in modal psychology. In The architecture of the imagination
, ed. S. Nichols, 237–255. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Nichols, S., S. Stich, and J. Weinberg. 2003. Metaskepticism: Meditations in ethno-epistemology. In The skeptics: Contemporary debates, ed. S. Luper, 227–247. Burlington: Ashgate.
Nichols, S., and R. Mallon. 2006. Moral rules and moral dilemmas. Cognition
Nichols, S., and J. Knobe. 2007. Moral responsibility and determinism: the cognitive science of folk intuitions. Nous
Nichols, S., and J. Ulatowski. 2007. Intuitions and individual differences: the Knobe effect revisited. Mind and Language
Petrinovich, L., and P. O’Neill. 1996. Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions. Ethology and Sociobiology
Petrinovich, L., P. O’Neill, and M. Jorgensen. 1993. An empirical study of moral intuitions: toward an evolutionary ethics. Journal of Personality and Social Research
Quine, W. 1951. Two dogmas of empiricism. Philosophical Review
Scholl, B. 2007. Object persistence in philosophy and psychology. Mind & Language
Scholl, B., and A. Leslie. 2003. Minds, modules, and meta-analysis. Child Development
Schwitzgebel, E. in press. Do ethicists steal more books. Philosophical Psychology.
Sperber, D. 1994. The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representation. In Mapping the mind, ed. L. Hirchfeld, and S. Gelman, 39–67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stanovich, K., and R. West. 2000. Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate. Behavior and Brain Sciences 23: 645–726.
Stotz, K., and P. Griffiths. 2004. Genes: philosophical analyses put to the test. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
Surian, L., and A. Leslie. 1999. Competence and performance in false belief understanding: A comparison of autistic and normal 3-year-old children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology
Swain, S., J. Alexander, and J. Weinberg. 2008. The instability of philosophical intuitions: running hot and cold on truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 138–155.
Ulatowski, J. 2008. How many theories of act individuation are there? Ph.D. Thesis. University of Utah, Salt Lake City.
Uhlmann, E., D. Pizzaro, D. Tannenbaum, and P. Ditto. 2009. The motivated use of moral principles. Judgment and Decision Making 4: 476–491.
Weinberg, J. 2007. How to challenge intuitions empirically without risking skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy
Weinberg, J., S. Nichols, and S. Stich. 2001. Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics 29: 429–460.
White, R. 2005. Epistemic permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives
Williamson, T. 2004. Philosophical ‘intuitions’ and scepticism about judgments. Dialectica
Williamson, T. 2005. Armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Williamson, T. 2007. The philosophy of philosophy
. Oxford: Blackwell.CrossRef
Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.