What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?
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Critics of functionalism about the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper, we consider the merits of appealing to the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We demonstrate that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense, and we report evidence that demonstrates that the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity is, to some extent, culturally specific rather than universally held. This being the case, we argue that mere appeal to the intuitive implausibility of collective consciousness does not offer any genuine insight into the nature of mentality in general, nor the nature of consciousness in particular.
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- What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume 1, Issue 2 , pp 225-243
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, 234 New North, 37th and O Streets NW, Washington, DC, 20057, USA
- 2. Department of Philosophy, Lewis & Clark College, 0615 SW Palatine Hill Rd, MSC 45, Portland, OR, 97219, USA
- 3. Department of Philosophy, Baruch College, CUNY, Box B5/295, One Bernard Baruch Way, New York, NY, 10010, USA