Abstract
According to Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007, Hist Philos Life Sci 33:389–396, 2011a, Philos Sci 1(1):47–69, 2011b), in order to establish a causal claim of the form, ‘C is a cause of E’, one typically needs evidence that there is an underlying mechanism between C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This thesis has been used to argue that hierarchies of evidence, as championed by evidence-based movements, tend to give primacy to evidence of difference making over evidence of mechanisms and are flawed because the two sorts of evidence are required and they should be treated on a par. An alternative approach gives primacy to evidence of mechanism over evidence of difference making. In this paper, we argue that this alternative approach is equally flawed, again because both sorts of evidence need to be treated on a par. As an illustration of this parity, we explain how scientists working in the ‘EnviroGenomarkers’ project constantly make use of the two evidential components in a dynamic and intertwined way. We argue that such an interplay is needed not only for causal assessment but also for policy purposes.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See the official website of the project: http://www.envirogenomarkers.net/.
Although, as we mentioned earlier, when commenting on the available evidence linking asbestos exposure and cancer, very strong statistical evidence can be enough, in conjunction with background knowledge of analogous mechanisms, to establish the existence of a mechanism as well as of difference making, and hence may licence the causal claim and its corresponding public health interventions.
This is a stock example in the philosophical literature, especially in discussions of causal overdetermination. For instance:
Suzy and Billy, expert rock throwers, are engaged in a competition to see who can shatter a target bottle first. They both pick up rocks and throw them at the bottle, but Suzy throws hers a split second before Billy. Consequently Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. ... Suzy’s throw is a cause of the shattering, but Billy’s is not (Hall 2004).
MEND stands for Mind, Exercise, Nutrition … Do it!. See http://www.mendprogramme.org/.
See the campaign website, where lots of information and tips are given (http://www.nhs.uk/Livewell/5ADAY/Pages/5ADAYhome.aspx).
References
Bechtel, W., A. Abrahamsen. 2005. Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36:421–441.
Boniolo, G., R. Faraldo, A. Saggion. 2011. Explicating the notion of ‘causation’: The role of extensive quantities. In: Causality in the sciences, eds. P. Illari, F. Russo, J. Williamson, 502–525. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Broadbent, A. 2011. Inferring causation in epidemiology: Mechanisms, black boxes, and contrasts. In Causality in the sciences, eds. P. Illari, F. Russo, J. Williamson, 45–69. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brownson, R.C., E.A. Baker, T.L. Leet, K.N. Gillespie. 2003. Evidence-based public health. New York: Oxford University Press.
Brownson, R.C., J.G. Gurney, G.H. Land. 1999. Evidence-based decision making in public health. Journal of Public Health Management Practice 5(5):86–97.
Campaner, R. 2011. Understanding mechanisms in the health sciences. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32:5–17.
Casini, L., P.M. Illari, F. Russo, J. Williamson. 2011. Models for prediction, explanation and control: recursive Bayesian networks. Theoria 26(1), 5–33.
Chadeau-Hyam, M., T.J. Athersuch, H.C. Keun, M.D. Iorio, T.M. Ebbels, M. Jenab, C. Sacerdote, S.J. Bruce, E. Holmes, P. Vineis. 2011. Meeting-in-the-middle using metabolic profiling—A strategy for the identification of intermediate biomarkers in cohort studies. Biomarkers 16(1):83–88.
Clarke, B. 2011. Causality in medicine with particular reference to the viral causation of cancers. PhD thesis, Department of Science and Technology Studies, University College London, London.
Darby, G., J. Williamson. 2011. Imaging technology and the philosophy of causality. Philosophy & Technology 24(2):115–136.
Dowe, P. 1992. Wesley Salmon’s process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory. Philosophy of Science 59(2):195–216.
Dowe P. (2000) Causality and explanation: Review of Salmon. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51:165–174
Galea, S., M. Riddle, G.A. Kaplan. 2010. Causal thinking and complex system approaches in epidemiology. International Journal of Epidemiology 39:97–106.
Gillies, D.A. 2011. The Russo–Williamson thesis and the question of whether smoking causes heart disease. In Causality in the sciences eds. P. Illari, F. Russo, J. Williamson, 110–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Glennan, S. 2002. Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science 69(Supplement):S342–S353.
Glymour, C., P.W. Cheng. 1998. Causal mechanism and probability: A normative approach. In Rational models of cognition, eds. M. Oaksford, N. Chater. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, N. 2004. Two concepts of causation. In: Causation and counterfactuals eds. J. Collins, N. Hall, L. Paul, 225–276. Cambridge MA, London: MIT Press.
Hill, B. 1965. The environment of disease: Association or causation? Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine 58:295–300.
Howick, J. 2011. Exposing the vanities—and a qualified defence—of mechanistic evidence in clinical decision-making. Philosophy of Science 78(5):926–940. Proceedings of the Biennial PSA 2010.
Illari, P.M. 2011a. Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25(2):139–157.
Illari P.M. (2011b) Why theories of causality need Production: An information transmission account. Philosophy & Technology 24(2):95–114.
Illari P.M., J. Williamson. 2012. What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms accross the sciences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2(1):119–135.
Killoran, A., M.P. Kelly ed. 2010. Evidence-based public health. Effectiveness and efficiency. New York: Oxford University Press.
Machamer, P., L. Darden, C. Craver. 2000. Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 67:1–25.
Rappaport, S.M., Smith, M.T. 2010. Environment and disease risks. Science 330:460–461.
Reichenbach, H. 1956. The direction of time, 1971 edition. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Russell, B. 1913. On the notion of cause. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13:1–26.
Russell, B. 1948. Human knowledge. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Russo, F. 2009. Causality and causal modelling in the social sciences. Measuring variations. Methodos Series. New York: Springer.
Russo, F. 2011. Causal webs in epidemiology. Paradigmi XXXIX(1):67–98.
Russo, F. 2012. Public health policy, evidence, and causation. Lessons from the studies on obesity. Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 15(2):141–151.
Russo, F., J. Williamson. 2007. Interpreting causality in the health sciences. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21(2):157–170.
Russo, F., J. Williamson. 2011a. Epistemic causality in medicine. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 33:389–396.
Russo, F., J. Williamson. 2011b. Generic versus single-case causality: The case of autopsy. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1(1):47–69.
Salmon, W.C. 1984. Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Salmon, W.C. 1997. Causality and explanation: A reply to two critiques. Philosophy of Science 64(3):461–477.
Scarff, K.L., K.S. Ung, H. Nandurkar, P.J. Crack, C.H. Bird, P.I. Bird. 2004. Targeted disruption of spi3/serpinb6 does not result in developmental or growth defects, leukocyte dysfunction, or susceptibility to stroke. Molecular and Cellular Biology 24(9):4075–4082.
Steel, D. 2007. Across the boundaries, extrapolation in biology and social science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomas, D.C. 2006. High-volume “-omics” technologies and the future of molecular epidemiology. Epidemiology 17(5):490–491.
Vineis, P., M. Chadeau-Hyam. 2011. Integrating biomarkers into molecular epidemiological studies. Current Opinion in Oncology 23(1):100–105.
Vineis, P., Khan, A.E., Vlaanderen, J., Vermeulen, R. 2009. The impact of new research technologies on our understanding of environmental causes of disease: the concept of clinical vulnerability. Environmental Health 8(54)
Vineis, P., Perera, F. 2007. Molecular epidemiology and biomarkers in etiologic cancer research: The new in light of the old. Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers & Prevention 16(10):1954–1965.
Weber, E. 2007. Conceptual tools for causal analysis in the social sciences. In Causality and probability in the sciences, eds. F. Russo, J. Williamson, 197–213. London: College Publications.
Weber, E. 2009. How probabilistic causation can account for the use of mechanistic evidence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23(3):277–295.
Williamson, J. 2005. Bayesian nets and causality: Philosophical and computational foundations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, J. 2009. Probabilistic theories. In The Oxford handbook of causation, eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, P. Menzies, 185–212. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, J. 2011. Mechanistic theories of causality. Philosophy Compass 6(6):421–447.
Acknowledgments
We thank the scientists that have been involved in the EnviroGenomarkers project, and especially Paolo Vineis and Marc Chadeau-Hyam, for spending time with us discussing the philosophical underpinnings of their project. We also thank Phyllis Illari and Lorenzo Casini for their comments, suggestions, and insights. Financial support from the British Academy and the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. F. Russo is currently ‘Pegasus Marie Curie Fellow’ of the Research Foundation— Flanders.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Russo, F., Williamson, J. EnviroGenomarkers: The Interplay Between Mechanisms and Difference Making in Establishing Causal Claims. Medicine Studies 3, 249–262 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12376-012-0079-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12376-012-0079-7