Are Bare Particulars Constituents?
- Richard Brian DavisAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Tyndale University College Email author
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In this article I examine an as yet unexplored aspect of J.P. Moreland’s defense of so-called bare particularism — the ontological theory according to which ordinary concrete particulars (e.g., Socrates) contain bare particulars as individuating constituents and property ‘hubs.’ I begin with the observation that if there is a constituency relation obtaining between Socrates and his bare particular, it must be an internal relation, in which case the natures of the relata will necessitate the relation. I then distinguish various ways in which a bare particular might be thought to have a nature and show that on none of these is it possible for a bare particular to be a constituent of a complex particular. Thus, Moreland’s attempt to resurrect bare particulars as ontologically indispensable entities is not wholly without difficulties.
KeywordsBare particulars Constituent ontology Relations Property instances
- Are Bare Particulars Constituents?
Volume 28, Issue 4 , pp 395-410
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- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Bare particulars
- Constituent ontology
- Property instances
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Tyndale University College, 25 Ballyconnor Court, Toronto, Ontario, CANADA, M2M 4B3