Acta Analytica

, Volume 28, Issue 4, pp 395–410

Are Bare Particulars Constituents?

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyTyndale University College
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12136-012-0178-9

Cite this article as:
Davis, R.B. Acta Anal (2013) 28: 395. doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0178-9

Abstract

In this article I examine an as yet unexplored aspect of J.P. Moreland’s defense of so-called bare particularism — the ontological theory according to which ordinary concrete particulars (e.g., Socrates) contain bare particulars as individuating constituents and property ‘hubs.’ I begin with the observation that if there is a constituency relation obtaining between Socrates and his bare particular, it must be an internal relation, in which case the natures of the relata will necessitate the relation. I then distinguish various ways in which a bare particular might be thought to have a nature and show that on none of these is it possible for a bare particular to be a constituent of a complex particular. Thus, Moreland’s attempt to resurrect bare particulars as ontologically indispensable entities is not wholly without difficulties.

Keywords

Bare particularsConstituent ontologyRelationsProperty instances

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012