In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. D. Ashfield’s Response Authors
First Online: 29 September 2012 Received: 12 July 2012 Accepted: 11 August 2012 DOI:
Cite this article as: Freitag, W. Acta Anal (2013) 28: 127. doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0168-y Abstract
The article responds to the objections M.D. Ashfield has raised to my recent attempt at saving epistemic contextualism from the knowability problem. First, it shows that Ashfield’s criticisms of my minimal conception of epistemic contextualism, even if correct, cannot reinstate the knowability problem. Second, it argues that these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the commitments of my minimal conception. I conclude that there is still no reason to maintain that epistemic contextualism has the knowability problem.
Keywords Epistemic Contextualism Minimal Contextualism Knowability Problem Factivity Problem Scepticism
This reply refers to the comment available at:
. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0153-5 References
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