, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 127-137
Date: 29 Sep 2012

In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. D. Ashfield’s Response

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Abstract

The article responds to the objections M.D. Ashfield has raised to my recent attempt at saving epistemic contextualism from the knowability problem. First, it shows that Ashfield’s criticisms of my minimal conception of epistemic contextualism, even if correct, cannot reinstate the knowability problem. Second, it argues that these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the commitments of my minimal conception. I conclude that there is still no reason to maintain that epistemic contextualism has the knowability problem.

This reply refers to the comment available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0153-5.