Acta Analytica

, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 127–137

In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. D. Ashfield’s Response


DOI: 10.1007/s12136-012-0168-y

Cite this article as:
Freitag, W. Acta Anal (2013) 28: 127. doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0168-y


The article responds to the objections M.D. Ashfield has raised to my recent attempt at saving epistemic contextualism from the knowability problem. First, it shows that Ashfield’s criticisms of my minimal conception of epistemic contextualism, even if correct, cannot reinstate the knowability problem. Second, it argues that these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the commitments of my minimal conception. I conclude that there is still no reason to maintain that epistemic contextualism has the knowability problem.


Epistemic ContextualismMinimal ContextualismKnowability ProblemFactivity ProblemScepticism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyHeidelberg UniversityHeidelbergGermany