New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism
- Jiri Benovsky
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In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more controversial) reason to believe that at least some versions of perdurantism also require tropes rather than universals.
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- New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism
Volume 28, Issue 2 , pp 223-227
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Jiri Benovsky (1)
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg, Av. de l’Europe 20, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland