Acta Analytica

, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp 461–478

Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge

Authors

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12136-012-0163-3

Cite this article as:
Hazlett, A. Acta Anal (2012) 27: 461. doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0163-3

Abstract

In this paper I argue, against some recent criticisms, that the factivity of “knows” does not support the traditional truth condition on knowledge. I articulate a conception of the factivity of “knows” on which it is a matter of cancelable pragmatic presupposition, and consider the epistemological implications of this.

Keywords

KnowledgePresuppositionFactive verbs

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012