How Boots Befooled the King: Wisdom, Truth, and the Stoics
- Sarah Wright
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Can the wise person be fooled? The Stoics take a very strong view on this question, holding that the wise person (or sage) is never deceived and never believes anything that is false. This seems to be an implausibly strong claim, but it follows directly from some basic tenets of the Stoic cognitive and psychological world-view. In developing an account of what wisdom really requires, I will explore the tenets of the Stoic view that lead to this infallibilism about wisdom, and show that many of the elements of the Stoic picture can be preserved in a more plausible fallibilist approach. Specifically, I propose to develop a Stoic fallibilist virtue epistemology that is based on the Stoic model of the moral virtues. This model of the intellectual virtues will show that (in keeping with a folk distinction) the wise person is never befooled, though that person might be fooled.
- Alston, W. (1988). The deontological conception of epistemic justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 257–299. CrossRef
- Annas, J. (1994). Hellenistic philosophy of mind. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.
- Annas, J. (1995). The morality of happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Aristotle. (1984). Complete works of Aristotle, The revised oxford translation, Ed. J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Code, L. (1987). Epistemic responsibility. Hanover and London: Brown University Press.
- Code, L. (2006). Ecological thinking; the politics of epistemic location. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Grimm, J. & W. (1884). Household tales by the Brothers Grimm, Trans. Margaret Hunt. London: George Bell and Sons.
- Irwin, T. H. (1998). Socratic paradox and stoic theory. In Companions to ancient thought volume 4: Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lehrer, K. & Paxson, T. (1969). Knowledge: Undefeated justified true belief. Journal of Philosophy, 66(8), 225–237.
- Long, A. A., & Sedley, D. N. (1987). The Hellenistic philosophers: Volume one, translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pyle, H. (1887). The wonder clock. New York: Harper & Row.
- Reed, B. (2002). The Stoics’ account of the cognitive impression. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 23, 147–180.
- Riggs, W. (2003). Understanding virtue and the virtue of understanding. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- How Boots Befooled the King: Wisdom, Truth, and the Stoics
Volume 27, Issue 2 , pp 113-126
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Intellectual virtues
- Sarah Wright (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, 107 Peabody Hall, Athens, GA, 30602, USA