How to Forget that “Know” is Factive
- Savas L. Tsohatzidis
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This paper examines, and rejects, a recent argument to the effect that knowledge is not truth-entailing, i.e. that “know” is not factive.
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- How to Forget that “Know” is Factive
Volume 27, Issue 4 , pp 449-459
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- 1. Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Philosophy, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, GR-54124, Thessaloniki, Greece