Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding Authors
First Online: 04 January 2012 Received: 17 July 2011 Accepted: 01 December 2011 DOI:
Cite this article as: Becker, K. Acta Anal (2012) 27: 145. doi:10.1007/s12136-011-0139-8 Abstract
Reliabilism is a theory that countenances basic knowledge, that is, knowledge from a reliable source, without requiring that the agent knows the source is reliable. Critics (especially Cohen
) have argued that such theories generate all-too-easy, intuitively implausible cases of higher-order knowledge based on inference from basic knowledge. For present purposes, the criticism might be recast as claiming that reliabilism implausibly generates cases of 2002 understanding from brute, basic knowledge. I argue that the easy knowledge (or easy understanding) criticism rests on an implicit mischaracterization of the notion of a reliable process. Properly understood, reliable processes do not permit the transition from basic knowledge to understanding based on inference. Keywords Basic knowledge Easy knowledge Epistemic closure Higher-order knowledge Reliabilism References
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