Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief Authors
First Online: 24 February 2011 Received: 07 November 2010 Accepted: 20 January 2011 DOI:
Cite this article as: Williams, J.N. Acta Anal (2012) 27: 9. doi:10.1007/s12136-011-0122-4
I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.
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