Acta Analytica

, Volume 26, Issue 3, pp 273–284

Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem


DOI: 10.1007/s12136-010-0112-y

Cite this article as:
Freitag, W. Acta Anal (2011) 26: 273. doi:10.1007/s12136-010-0112-y


The paper critically examines an objection to epistemic contextualism recently developed by Elke Brendel and Peter Baumann, according to which it is impossible for the contextualist to know consistently that his theory is true. I first present an outline of contextualism and its reaction to scepticism. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise are explored. Finally, it will be argued that contextualism does not fulfil these minimal conditions. It will be shown that the contrary view is based on a misunderstanding of what contextualists are claiming.


Epistemic contextualismScepticismKnowability problemFactivity problem

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, ZukunftskollegUniversity of KonstanzKonstanzGermany